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 NOTE 
Incarcerated for Indigence: Probation 
Revocation for Inability to Pay Court-
Ordered Fines Found to Violate Due Process 
State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224 (Mo. 2017) 
(en banc) 
Aaron Wynhausen 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Currently, in Missouri, if you are an alleged criminal offender unable to 
afford bail, sitting in county jail waiting for trial, you may be racking up a bill 
worth thousands of dollars for your “care.”  State prosecutors and judges have 
the discretion to impose this bill upon you, and if you are unable to pay this bill 
for any reason, then the true cost may well be the incalculable expense of your 
freedom.  The Supreme Court of Missouri recently considered a case that fol-
lowed this pattern and ultimately released a man who spent three years in state 
prison for failure to “pay for his stay” while awaiting trial in a county jail. 
William Fleming was an indigent resident of Farmington, Missouri, on 
probation for assault.1  His five-year probation term was revoked after four 
years and ten months, and he was then sentenced to a seven-year prison term 
solely for a failure to pay court-ordered fines in the time allotted by the court.2  
He filed for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court of Missouri, chal-
lenging the sufficiency of his sentence, and he won.3  The court found his due 
process rights were violated because the sentencing court failed to follow es-
tablished judicial procedures for revoking probation when an offender fails to 
pay legal financial obligations (“LFOs”).4  His equal protection rights were 
also violated because the sentencing court neglected to account for his indi-
gence as the impetus for his failure to pay – a condition that offenders with 
 
J.D. Candidate, anticipated graduation in May 2019. Missouri Law Review Lead Arti-
cles Editor. I would like to thank Professor Ben Trachtenberg for guidance and sugges-
tions for improving this note, as well as Courtney Lock, Abigail Williams, Emma 
Masse, Aristotle Butler, and Anthony Meyer for proofreading and formatting help. 
 1. See Service Information, State v. William A Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864, 
(Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Francois Cty. May 1, 2008). 
 2. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 226, 228 
(Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 3. Id. at 225–26. 
 4. Id. at 234. 
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financial means would have far less trouble satisfying.5  Habeas corpus was 
thus granted despite Fleming’s release on parole, a status that could arguably 
cure the restrictions to his liberty due to a lack of physical imprisonment.6 
The outcome of this case is important for a few reasons.  First, it demon-
strates the state judiciary’s reluctance to condone imprisonment for a defend-
ant’s inability to pay court-ordered fines and costs.  This reluctance is under-
scored by other recent legislative and judicial developments in Missouri that 
indicate a problem exists and needs to be actively addressed.   Defense attor-
neys, prosecutors, and judges should now be on notice of the required proce-
dure when sentencing an offender to jail for financial shortcomings.  Second, 
it highlights the potential for unjust outcomes in Missouri’s current statutory 
scheme.  The vast bulk of the fines imposed on Fleming came from a “pay-to-
stay” statute called the Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act (“MIRA”) 
that transfers the costs of a prisoner’s “care” directly to the prisoner.7  While 
such statutes are common throughout the country,8 their efficacy and actual 
reduction of financial burdens to taxpayers are dubious.  When combined with 
another Missouri statute that provides state reimbursement to counties based 
on per diem prisoner population, a potentially perverse incentive for courts to 
encourage stricter sentencing is created.  Third, the court’s broad interpretation 
of Missouri’s writ of habeas corpus jurisprudence reaffirms a commitment to 
liberty for state residents.  By not considering the case moot upon Fleming’s 
release to parole, the court acknowledged the common law roots of the doctrine 
and upheld the right of residents to challenge restrictive government intrusion 
into their lives.  In short, the outcome in this decision was apt and is hopefully 
indicative of further changes in the way the state legal system treats its poorest 
residents. 
This Note introduces the facts and holding of the case at hand in Part II.  
Part III then explores the legal background on which the outcome of the case 
rested.  Next, Part IV summarizes the instant decision and holding.  Finally, 
Part V provides commentary on the case and the propriety of its outcome be-
fore suggesting further developments to the Missouri criminal justice system. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
William Fleming sought a writ of habeas corpus against the Missouri 
Board of Probation and Parole from the Supreme Court of Missouri.9  Flem-
ing’s ordeal began when he was served with an arrest warrant for domestic 
 
 5. Id. at 231, 234.  Although this case mentions both due process and equal pro-
tection, the bulk of this court’s opinion was analyzed on grounds of due process, and 
this Note follows accordingly. 
 6. See id. at 234. 
 7. Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 217.825–
217.841 (2016). 
 8. See, e.g., The State Correctional Facility Reimbursement Act, MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 800.401 (West 2018). 
 9. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 225. 
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assault on May 1, 2008.10  On May 6, he was arraigned and received his first 
hearing.11  Fleming asserted indigence and submitted an application for public 
defender assistance, which was granted.12  On May 27, a bond reduction hear-
ing was held and his bond was set at $50,000 – an amount Fleming was unable 
to post.13  On June 24, the case was moved to the Twenty-Fourth Judicial Cir-
cuit, and another arraignment hearing was scheduled for July 11 of that year.14  
At that arraignment, Fleming appeared and pled not guilty to two counts of 
second-degree domestic assault, one count of second-degree assault, and one 
count of unlawful use of a weapon.15  A trial was scheduled for July 31.16  
Prior to his scheduled trial, Fleming agreed to a plea bargain; thus, the 
trial instead became a sentencing hearing.17  Fleming subsequently pleaded 
guilty to the two counts of second-degree domestic assault, and the State agreed 
not to prosecute the other charges.18  He was then sentenced to serve two con-
current seven-year prison terms, the execution of which was suspended and 
replaced with five years of supervised probation.19  The terms of Fleming’s 
probation included completion of a domestic abuse or anger management pro-
gram, a mental health program, and payment of “court costs” within three 
years.20  The court costs were calculated to include expenses and fees of 
$301.50 for the public defender lien,21 a ninety-two dollar reimbursement to 
the Crime Victims’ Compensation Fund, and a $3870 jail “board bill” for the 
twelve weeks he spent incarcerated while awaiting disposition of his case.22  
Thus, Fleming’s total bill was $4263.50, and his probation was scheduled to 
end on July 30, 2013.23 
 
 10. Since the case was for domestic assault, the details of the original crime are 
sealed.  See Warrant Issuance, State v. Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864 (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. 
Francois Cty. May 1, 2008). 
 11. Initial Arraignment Hearing, Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864 (May 6, 2008). 
 12. Indigency Hearing, Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864 (May 6, 2008). 
 13. See Bond Reduction Hearing, Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864-01 (May 27, 
2008). 
 14. Waiver of Preliminary Hearing, Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864-01 (June 23, 
2008). 
 15. Judgment, Fleming, No. 08D7-CR00864-01 (July 11, 2008). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Respondent’s Brief at 1, State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 
515 S.W.3d 224 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) (No. SC 95764). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 226. 
 20. Id. 
 21. See MO. REV. STAT. § 600.090.2 (2016) (Missouri public defender services are 
not free to defendants, public defender liens are imposed upon “any and all property” 
of a defendant receiving assistance in an amount calculated to be the “reasonable value 
of the services rendered.”), amended by S.B. No. 735 (2016). 
 22. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 226 (If Fleming had been able to post bail, the accrual 
of this fee amount under MIRA could have been largely avoided.). 
 23. Id. 
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Fleming’s financial means were very limited.24  He was unemployed and 
reported to his probation officer that his primary source of income was a 
monthly Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) disbursement for a physical 
injury and bipolar disorder that amounted to $449 per month.25  In April 2009, 
he agreed to make monthly payments of $118 to the court, but he made only 
one payment of this amount, in May 2009.26  In August 2009, Fleming’s pro-
bation officer issued a citation for failure to make the monthly payments and 
wrote in a case summary that Fleming continued “to have financial difficulties” 
and failed to receive housing assistance.27  After the citation, Fleming made 
semi-regular ten-dollar monthly payments but was able to pay only a total of 
$288 by the end of the three-year period set by the sentencing court.28 
In August 2011, Fleming’s probation officer filed a violation report for 
failure to pay the balance of the court costs within the specified time.29  The 
report highlighted Fleming’s financial difficulties, noted he would continue to 
make ten-dollar payments, discussed the possibility of proscribing alternative 
arrangements to count as credit for the costs, and requested a probation revo-
cation hearing to best determine how to proceed.30  A hearing was held on Sep-
tember 9, 2011, during which Fleming admitted to violating the payment con-
dition of his probation.31  The court accepted his admission without making 
any inquiry into the reasons for his failure to make payment in full.32  Disposi-
tion of the probation revocation was deferred for three months on the condition 
that $150 be paid in fifty-dollar monthly installments before a rehearing in De-
cember  2011.33  Fleming did not make the monthly payments but managed to 
make a lump-sum $150 payment prior to the deadline.34 
At the December hearing, Fleming was ordered to continue making fifty-
dollar monthly payments, a task at which he achieved partial success, and the 
formal probation revocation hearing was continued and rescheduled multiple 
times until April 12, 2013.35  By the time of the April hearing, with only a 
couple months left of his probation, Fleming had paid over $1100 toward his 
total bill but still owed over $3000.36  In the meantime, the balance of the jail 
boarding bill had been sent to a collection agency, which had begun garnishing 
his SSI checks to pay off the debt.37   Fleming argued he had complied with all 
 
 24. Id. at 227. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 17, at 1–2. 
 27. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 227. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 230. 
 33. Id. at 227. 
 34. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 17, at 6. 
 35. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 227. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Relator’s Brief at 12, Fleming, 515 S.W.3d 224 (No. SC 95764). 
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other conditions of his probation, insisted he was indigent, and suggested that 
his payments of $1100 were evidence he was making a good-faith effort to 
complete the probation terms, despite his indigence.38  The State argued that 
Fleming’s poor payment record indicated he had not made a good-faith effort 
to pay the costs, despite having the means to do so, and that his admission at 
the September 2011 hearing precluded any later argument of indigence.39 
The court agreed with the State, revoked Fleming’s probation, and, after 
nearly five years of probation, ordered execution of the prison sentences solely 
based upon the admission at the September hearing.40  Despite a statement by 
the sentencing judge that people should not “be sent to prison because they 
can’t pay their court costs,” the court concluded that the only option was to 
revoke probation, even though it admitted the availability of other means of 
punishment.41  Thus, nearly five years after a guilty plea for domestic assault, 
the court sent an indigent Missourian – relying on SSI disability for income 
and represented by a public defender – to a seven-year prison sentence for fail-
ing to pay for his three-month stay in county jail, which itself resulted from an 
inability to post a $50,000 bond after arrest.42 
Fleming filed a writ of habeas corpus with the Twenty-Fourth Judicial 
Circuit in October 2015, which was denied.43  He then filed a writ of habeas 
corpus with the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, in March 2016, 
which was also denied.44  Finally, he filed a writ of habeas corpus with the 
Supreme Court of Missouri in June 2016, which was ultimately granted after it 
was amended to reflect his new status as a parolee.45 
The Supreme Court of Missouri held that when Fleming’s probation was 
revoked for failure to pay assessed court costs, his due process and equal pro-
tection rights were violated.46   This outcome resulted because the sentencing 
court had not made an inquiry into his ability to pay, determined if he had made 
bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay, nor considered alternative 
means of punishment – despite ample evidence demonstrating his indigent sta-
tus.47  Fleming was discharged from his sentence of imprisonment and parole 
and restored to his status as a probationer for sixty days, giving the State the 
option to reinitiate revocation proceedings if it could present evidence to defeat 
the indigence claim.48 
 
 38. See id. at 15–16. 
 39. Respondent’s Brief, supra note 17, at 20. 
 40. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 228. 
 41. Id. (Alternative means of punishment could have included imposition of com-
munity service, an extension of the time to pay, a reduction of the imposed fees, or 
credit for successful completion of court-approved programs.). 
 42. See id. 
 43. Relator’s Brief, supra note 37, at 7. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 228. 
 46. Id. at 225–26. 
 47. Id. 
 48. See id. at 226. 
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III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The legal theories in this case strike at the following questions: (1) Are 
the impositions of court costs and hefty jail boarding bills a restriction of liberty 
to indigent defendants?  (2) Should parolees and probationers be afforded the 
right to challenge the restraint of their “liberty” through extraordinary writs?  
(3) What procedures should the State pursue to ensure impoverished defend-
ants are not wrung out and then hung out to dry by a complex and expensive 
legal system?  Section A examines the constitutional due process and equal 
protection requirements that a court make some finding that a probationer will-
fully refused to pay court costs prior to revoking probation for failure to pay.  
Next, Section B considers the application of Missouri habeas corpus law in 
circumstances where the petitioner is no longer in physical custody.  Finally, 
Section C highlights the Missouri statutes responsible for the bulk of the LFOs 
imposed on Fleming, which led to his ultimate incarceration. 
A.  The Requirement that Courts Find a Means to Pay LFOs Before 
Revoking Probation 
The constitutional standard for probation revocation when a defendant 
has failed to make court-ordered restitution payments is relatively straightfor-
ward.  The Supreme Court of the United States has held that the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit a state 
from revoking a defendant’s probation without first determining his or her abil-
ity to pay.49 
In Bearden v. Georgia, the Court resolved a split among state courts about 
whether automatic revocation for failure to pay court costs violated the Four-
teenth Amendment.50  In doing so, the Court affirmed its “sensitive” treatment 
of indigents in the criminal justice system.51  The Court proceeded to outline 
 
 49. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
 50. Id. at 663–64. 
 51. Id. at 664 (citing Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) 
(Black, J.)) (“[T]here can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends 
on the amount of money he has.”); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 245 (1970) (hold-
ing that a state cannot subject a certain class of convicted defendants to imprisonment 
beyond a statutory maximum solely because they cannot afford to pay a fine); Tate v. 
Short, 401 U.S. 395, 396–98 (1971) (holding that a state cannot imprison a defendant 
for failing to pay a fine assessed pursuant to a fine-only statute solely because the de-
fendant was indigent and unable to pay the fine immediately).  But see United States v. 
MacCollum, 426 U.S. 317, 328 (1976) (plurality opinion) (rejecting an equal protection 
challenge to federal statute providing indigent defendants with a free trial transcript, 
but only if the court certifies the challenge is not frivolous). 
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why due process rights and, secondarily, equal protection rights were impli-
cated in cases regarding a state’s treatment of indigent defendants.52  With re-
gards to due process, the question is “whether and when it is fundamentally 
unfair or arbitrary for the State to revoke probation when an indigent is unable 
to pay the fine.”53  The Court also stated that there is “no doubt that the State 
has treated the petitioner differently from a person who did not fail to pay the 
imposed fine and therefore did not violate probation.”54 To decide if this treat-
ment is a violation of equal protection, “one must determine whether, and under 
what circumstances, a defendant’s indigent status may be considered in the de-
cision . . . to revoke probation.”55 
The Court summarized the rule upon which it would decide Bearden by 
stating “if the State determines a fine or restitution to be the appropriate and 
adequate penalty for the crime, it may not thereafter imprison a person solely 
because he lacked the resources to pay it.”56  However, probationers that had 
the means to pay and willfully refused or failed to make a bona fide effort to 
seek employment or borrow money to cover the fine could still face incarcera-
tion.57  Thus, recognizing that the decision to place a defendant on probation 
reflected the State’s determination that its “penological interests do not require 
imprisonment” and that a probationer who otherwise complied with the terms 
of probation and made a bona fide effort to pay “demonstrated [his] willingness 
to pay his debt to society,” the Court concluded that due process requires a 
sentencing court to first make an inquiry into the reasons why a probationer 
could not pay before revoking probation.58 
Georgia argued that retaining the ability to revoke probation for failure to 
pay acts as a deterrent to keep other probationers from forgoing payment obli-
gations.59  The Court responded that the State had alternative means to enforce 
judgments against indigent clients, such as extending the time to make pay-
ments, reducing the fine, or assigning the probationer to some form of labor or 
public service in place of the fine.60  The Court ultimately held: 
 
 52. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665–68 (citing Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974)) 
(“[W]e generally analyze the fairness of relations between the criminal defendant and 
the State under the Due Process Clause, while we approach the question whether the 
State has invidiously denied one class of defendants a substantial benefit available to 
another class of defendants under the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 53. Id. at 666; see also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding 
that in certain cases “fundamental fairness – the touchstone of due process – will require 
that the State provide at its expense counsel for indigent probationers or parolees”). 
 54. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 665. 
 55. Id. at 666. 
 56. Id. at 667–68. 
 57. Id. at 668. 
 58. Id. at 670. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 672 (quoting Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Williams v. Illinois, 
observing that “the deterrent effect of a fine is apt to derive more from its pinch on the 
7
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[I]n revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine or restitution, a sen-
tencing court must inquire into the reasons for the failure to pay. If the 
probationer willfully refused to pay or failed to make sufficient bona 
fide efforts legally to acquire the resources to pay, the court may revoke 
probation and sentence the defendant to imprisonment within the au-
thorized range of its sentencing authority. If the probationer could not 
pay despite sufficient bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to do so, 
the court must consider alternate measures of punishment other than 
imprisonment. . . . To do otherwise would deprive the probationer of 
his conditional freedom simply because, through no fault of his own, he 
cannot pay the fine.61 
Missouri courts have implemented the Bearden ruling.62  In Schmeets v. 
Turner, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, considered a writ of 
habeas corpus from Edith Schmeets, a woman whose probation was revoked 
when she failed to make restitution payments after pleading guilty to passing 
bad checks.63  Despite evidence of significant financial difficulty,64 Schmeets 
had her probation revoked based upon testimony from her probation officer 
that she “could definitely have had more income if she had tried.”65  The court 
noted that under Bearden, due process only required a finding that the proba-
tioner’s failure to pay was not due to an inability to pay.66  The court went on 
to observe that Bearden did not address the sufficiency of evidence and as long 
as the judge at the revocation hearing was “reasonably satisfied” with the evi-
dence showing a willful failure to pay restitution, then there was no due process 
violation.67  Because there was testamentary evidence suggesting Schmeets 
could have made a greater effort to pay – and no alternative punishment either 
suggested or available – the Bearden standard was met and revocation was ap-
propriate.68 
 
purse than the time of payment” (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 265 (1970) 
(Harlan, J. concurring))). 
 61. Id. at 672–73. 
 62. See Schmeets v. Turner, 706 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); Jackson 
v. Gill, 711 F. Supp. 1503, 1506–07 (W.D. Mo. 1989); State ex rel. Nixon v. Campbell, 
906 S.W.2d 369, 371 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) (citing Bearden for the proposition that 
revocation of probation may still be appropriate in special circumstances in which pro-
bationer was not at fault for violation but no procedural alternative exists). 
 63. Schmeets, 706 S.W.2d at 505–06. 
 64. For instance, her primary source of income was only $200 per month in social 
security, and she otherwise had only intermittent part-time employment, cared for her 
two children, did not own a vehicle, reported multiple health issues and hospitaliza-
tions, and received food and housing assistance from a charitable assistance group.  Id. 
 65. Id. at 505 (quotation marks omitted).  There was additional testimony from a 
social worker who had assisted Schmeets during her time on probation and claimed she 
“would have no difficulty” conducting manual labor type work.  Id. at 506. 
 66. Id. at 507–08. 
 67. Id. (citing Sincup v. Blackwell, 608 S.W.2d 389, 391 (Mo. 1980) (en banc)). 
 68. Id. at 508. 
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Regarding the sufficiency of evidence in revocation hearings, the Su-
preme Court of Missouri has previously found that due process requires the 
factfinder to make, at a minimum, a written statement of the evidence relied 
upon and the reasons for revoking probation.69  The other constitutional re-
quirements for a revocation hearing were previously spelled out by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in Gagnon v. Scarpelli70 and include: 
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of [probation or] parole; (b) 
disclosure to the [probationer or] parolee of evidence against him; (c) 
opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and docu-
mentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine adverse 
witnesses . . . (e) a “neutral and detached” hearing body . . . and (f) a 
written statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and 
reasons for revoking [probation or] parole.71 
The Supreme Court of Missouri in Abel v. Wyrick went on to state that “[t]he 
judge at a probation revocation hearing must allow a probationer a meaningful 
opportunity to present his evidence, and must consider that evidence.”72 
In a case with facts similar to Fleming, the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Missouri examined Bearden’s evidentiary hearing 
requirement.73  In Jackson v. Gill, Debra Mae Jackson was convicted of forging 
checks and placed on four years of probation, with one of the terms requiring 
restitution of nearly $4000.74  Jackson’s probation was revoked after she failed 
to make adequate payments towards the debt within the allotted four-year pe-
riod.75  The district court, examining the record of the revocation hearing, con-
cluded that insufficient factual inquiry had been made into Jackson’s statement 
that she “just [had not] been able to work” and that the State failed to introduce 
any additional evidence.76  The sentencing judge appeared to rely on a state-
ment by the prosecutor, who said, “I really don’t think that the state is going to 
get restitution in these cases for these victims, so the penitentiary sentence 
 
 69. See Abel v. Wyrick, 574 S.W.2d 411, 417 (Mo. 1978) (en banc); see also Jack-
son v. Gill, 711 F. Supp. 1503, 1511–12 (W.D. Mo. 1989) (stating it is of “paramount 
importance” for revocation court to file a written statement of the evidence upon which 
probation is revoked). 
 70. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973). 
 71. See Abel, 574 S.W.2d at 417 (quoting Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 786). 
 72. Id. at 419. 
 73. Jackson, 711 F. Supp. at 1503 (The facts in both cases involve a successful 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus after an indigent offender’s probation was revoked 
for failure to pay full restitution to the court within the probationary period.). 
 74. Id. at 1508. 
 75. Id. at 1511.  At a hearing two years prior, the court had ordered Jackson to pay 
twenty percent of her future earnings towards the restitution.  Id. at 1510.  At her revo-
cation hearing her attorney argued that her earnings had been very limited in the two-
year period because she had been unable to work due to numerous health problems.  Id. 
at 1511.  The court concluded that she had paid only $375 prior to revocation.  Id. 
 76. Id. 
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seems to be the thing to do.”77  The court order revoking her probation stated 
that it was made “after evidence being heard,” but the district court concluded 
that no actual evidence had been adduced at the hearing.78  Additionally, and 
“[o]f paramount importance,” the trial court “never filed a written statement of 
the evidence or the reasons upon which it relied when petitioner’s probation 
was revoked.”79  Jackson’s writ of habeas corpus was granted based on a vio-
lation of the due process requirements articulated in Bearden and Abel.80  The 
Jackson court distinguished the outcome in Schmeets by noting that the evi-
dentiary hearing in Schmeets included testimony and recommendations from 
the defendant’s probation officer and other witnesses.81 
Case law from Missouri, a federal district court considering Missouri law, 
and the Supreme Court of the United States clearly establishes that to satisfy 
due process, probation revocation hearings for failure to pay court-ordered res-
titution require some sort of inquiry into the defendant’s ability to pay.  This is 
a non-controversial requirement with such a low burden of production that, at 
least in Missouri, testimony that the probationer could try harder to pay the 
debt appears sufficient to meet the burden.82  The absence of additional testi-
mony or fact finding or a naked admission by the defendant acknowledging a 
failure to pay at an earlier revocation hearing appears to be insufficient.83 
The outcome in Fleming prompted the issuance of a “bench card”84 to all 
Missouri lower court judges outlining the correct procedure for the “Lawful 
Enforcement of Legal Financial Obligations.”85  Evidentiary factors the bench 
card suggests courts consider when determining if a defendant willfully failed 
to pay include: whether income is below the poverty line, the receipt of means-
tested public assistance, financial resources, housing status, basic living ex-
penses, defendant’s efforts to acquire more financial resources, other court fees 
currently owed, and whether the imposed fees would result in a “manifest hard-
ship” to the defendant or his or her family.86 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 1511–12. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 1505–06, 1512. 
 81. Id. at 1506. 
 82. See Schmeets v. Turner, 706 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). 
 83. See Jackson, 711 F. Supp. at 1509, 1511–12; State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. 
of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 225–26 (Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 84. See MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.04 app. D.  A bench card is a tool provided to judges 
to help provide reference and summarize relevant rules in an area of law.  Torie Atkin-
son, Note, A Fine Scheme: How Municipal Fines Become Crushing Debt in the Shadow 
of the New Debtors’ Prisons, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 189, 233 (2016).  In this case, 
the bench card issued by Chief Justice Breckenridge is appending Missouri Supreme 
Court Rule 37.  See MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.04 app. D. 
 85. MO. SUP. CT. R. 37.04 app. D. 
 86. Id. 
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B.  Missouri’s Habeas Corpus Standard 
The second point at issue in Fleming, to which Judge Zel M. Fischer de-
voted the bulk of his dissent, was whether granting a writ of habeas corpus to 
a defendant who had already been released on parole was appropriate or 
whether, instead, his release rendered the action moot.  Article I, section 12 of 
the Missouri Constitution states: “the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus 
shall never be suspended.”87  The constitution further grants the Supreme Court 
of Missouri the authority to “issue and determine original remedial writs,” in-
cluding habeas corpus.88  The Missouri legislature codified what habeas corpus 
means in Missouri Revised Statutes section 532, which states that “[e]very per-
son committed, detained, confined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, 
for any criminal or supposed criminal matter, or under any pretense whatsoever 
. . . may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus.”89  Missouri Supreme Court Rule 
91 governs habeas corpus procedure for the state courts.  Rule 91.01 states that 
“[a]ny person restrained of liberty within this state may petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus to inquire into the cause of such restraint.”90  Habeas corpus 
proceedings are limited to determining the facial validity of confinement and 
“are properly invoked to challenge an improper probation revocation.”91 
Missouri case law states that “a writ of habeas corpus may be issued when 
a person is restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution or laws 
of the state or federal government.”92  Chief Justice Patricia Breckenridge, 
writing for the majority, stated that the “[c]ourt has never interpreted the ‘re-
strained of his liberty’ language,” but the issue has been considered by other 
state courts.93  In Hyde v. Nelson, the court stated that “any restraint which 
precludes freedom of action is sufficient, and actual confinement in jail is not 
necessary.”94  Two other Supreme Court of Missouri cases have cited the lan-
guage in Hyde, albeit in the context of determining whether a movant was in 
custody while seeking post-conviction relief, rather than considering a request 
for a writ of habeas corpus.95 
The Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District, upheld a writ requested 
by a parolee because he was “restrained of his liberty within this state and was 
 
 87. MO. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
 88. Id. art. V, § 4. 
 89. MO. REV. STAT. § 532.010 (2016) (emphasis added). 
 90. MO. SUP. CT. R. 91.01(b) (emphasis added). 
 91. State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 73 S.W.3d 623, 624 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 92. State ex rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W. 3d 541, 545–46 (Mo. 2003) (en banc) 
(citing Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d at 214). 
 93. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 228 n.6 
(Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 94. Hyde v. Nelson, 229 S.W. 200, 202 (Mo. 1921). 
 95. Nicholson v. State, 524 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); State v. Gray, 
406 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. 1966). 
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inquiring into the cause of his restraint.”96  The Supreme Court of the United 
States, in considering the restraint of liberty placed upon a parolee, has stated 
that while “parole releases [a prisoner] from immediate physical imprisonment, 
it imposes conditions which significantly confine and restrain his freedom; this 
is enough to keep him in the ‘custody’ of the . . . [parole board] within the 
meaning of the habeas corpus statute.”97  A Missouri statute states that “[e]very 
offender while on parole shall remain in the legal custody of the department 
[of corrections] but shall be subject to the orders of the board.”98 
Judge Fischer’s dissent in Fleming argued that status as a parolee renders 
a request for a writ of habeas corpus moot.99  In State ex rel. Aziz v. McCondi-
chie, Aziz was granted release on parole after his petition for a writ was ac-
cepted and under consideration by the Supreme Court of Missouri.100  In oral 
arguments, Aziz claimed that despite his newfound parolee status, the condi-
tions placed upon him by the board were a significant enough due process vi-
olation to deprive him of his liberty under state statutes.101  The court held that 
because the petition was sought to earn release from prison, which happened 
through parole, the case was moot.102 
The Supreme Court of the United States approached this issue in Jones v. 
Cunningham103 and Carafas v. LaVallee and held that a federal habeas corpus 
petitioner’s cause is not moot just because of an unconditional release in state 
court.104  However, in the instant case, Judge Fischer suggested that federal 
habeas cases involve interpretation of federal statutes, which have little bearing 
on interpretation of state statutes.105  Judge Fischer’s conclusion was based on 
principles of federalism, namely that each state has the right to an independent 
interpretation of its habeas corpus statutes.106 
 
 96. See State ex rel. Nixon v. Dierker, 22 S.W.3d 787, 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000). 
 97. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 242–43 (1963). 
 98. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.690.2 (2016). 
 99. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 234 (en 
banc) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 100. State ex rel. Aziz v. McCondichie, 132 S.W.3d 238, 239 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) 
(per curiam). 
 101. Id.  Conditions included electronic monitoring and required residence in a half-
way house.  Id. 
 102. Id. at 241. 
 103. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963). 
 104. See Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 236–38 (1968) (overruling Parker v. 
Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960)) (finding that petitioner was released from both prison and 
parole by the time the Court took up the case). 
 105. State ex rel. Fleming v. Missouri Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 237 
(Mo. 2017) (en banc) (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. 
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C.  Missouri Statutes Responsible for Imposition of Court Costs in 
Fleming 
Fleming’s briefs placed a heavy emphasis on the source of the costs im-
posed upon him and suggested that, absent the “board bill,” he would have 
successfully completed the imposed restitution.107  Fleming’s court costs were 
divided as follows: $92 to the Crime Victim’s Compensation Program, $301.50 
for a public defender lien, and $3870 for his jail board bill.108 
The Crime Victim’s Compensation Program is designed to provide finan-
cial assistance to people who have physical or psychological injuries as a result 
of violent crimes.109  The program is governed by Missouri Revised Statutes 
chapter 595 and helps cover items such as lost wages, medical expenses, fu-
neral expenses, and counseling expenses.110 
Missouri Public Defender services are not offered free of charge, even to 
the temporarily indigent.111  A person is considered eligible to receive repre-
sentation from the service only if a determination is made that the person is 
indigent.112  Missouri law further states that “if the state provides [a public de-
fender], the client may be liable to the state for the cost of the services and 
expenses of the lawyer . . . if [the client] is or will be able to pay all or any part 
of such costs.”113  The chapter further states that it is up to the court to deter-
mine the defendant’s ability to pay, the reasonable value of the services, and 
whether to impose the costs upon the defendant.114 
The jail boarding costs were implemented through MIRA, which allows 
the state to collect up to ninety percent of an inmate’s assets in order to pay for 
the costs of imprisonment.115  When an offender116 is sentenced to imprison-
 
 107. Relator’s Brief, supra note 37, at 15–16. 
 108. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 226. 
 109. Crime Victims’ Compensation Program, MO. DEP’T PUB. SAFETY, 
http://dps.mo.gov/dir/programs/cvc/ (last visited June 1, 2018). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Public Defender Fees, MO. ST. PUB. DEFENDER, http://www.pub-
licdefender.mo.gov/contracts/Client_Fee_Information_Sheet.pdf (last visited June 1, 
2018).  It is common for state public defender services to have an associated fee; in 
fact, one study found that forty-three states and the District of Columbia apply some 
sort of charge for access to a public defender’s services.  See Joseph Shapiro, As Court 
Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor. 
 112. See MO. REV. STAT. § 600.086 (2016). 
 113. MO. REV. STAT. § 600.048.1(3) (2016). 
 114. See MO. REV. STAT. § 600.090 (2016), amended by S.B. No. 735 (2016). 
 115. See Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 217.825–
217.841 (2016). 
 116. Defined as “any person who is under the jurisdiction of the department and is 
confined in any state correctional center or is under the continuing jurisdiction of the 
department.”  Id. § 217.827.5. 
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ment, he or she is given a form on which to provide the Department of Correc-
tions with information regarding assets.117  The attorney general has discretion 
to file a complaint in state circuit courts – which have exclusive jurisdiction 
over MIRA claims – if he or she “has good cause to believe” that the offender 
has sufficient assets to cover the costs of “care” for the offender’s time incar-
cerated.118  “Sufficient assets” is considered to be the lessor of at least “ten 
percent of the estimated cost of care of the offender” or ten percent of the cost 
of care for two years.119  Notice of the complaint is served to the offender, and 
a hearing is held to determine if the listed assets should be applied to the claim 
from the State.120  The court has discretion to determine whether the offender’s 
assets are to be applied upon those costs.121  The State has broad powers to 
investigate the breadth of an offender’s assets and may enforce payment over 
all other debts or encumbrances.122  Offenders may be subjected to wage gar-
nishments or payments from any source for up to five years after their release 
from custody.123  Laws such as MIRA, sometimes referred to as “pay-to-stay” 
laws, are also common in the United States; at least forty-one states allow for 
inmates to be charged for their room and board while incarcerated.124 
Fleming’s brief argued that jail board bills are tallied as a separate entity 
from the other assessed costs at the time probation is granted and should not be 
considered in the same light as other failures to pay restitution.125  At least one 
Missouri court has noticed a discrepancy and suggested defendants should not 
be expected to know that their board bills will be included with the remainder 
of their court costs.126  That court observed: 
Again, the orders of probation do not state Relator was responsible for 
paying board fees.  Nothing in the record before this Court suggests 
Relator knew prior to entry of her guilty plea that she would be charged 
 
 117. Id. § 217.829. 
 118. Id. §§ 217.831, 217.835. 
 119. For example, if the offender is sentenced to ten years of incarceration at an 
estimated cost of $1000 per month, then to trigger liability under MIRA the prisoner 
would only need assets totaling an amount equal to ten percent of two years’ worth of 
care, or $2400 ($1000 x 24 months x 10%).  Id. § 217.831.3. 
 120. Id. § 217.835. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. § 217.837. 
 123. Id. §§ 217.829.5, 217.831.3 (this includes pensions, payments into a bank or 
jail account, or essentially any other “asset”); see, e.g., State ex rel. Nixon v. Peterson, 
253 S.W.3d 77, 81–82 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (finding that payments to prisoner for 
woodcrafts he produced and sold while incarcerated could be considered “assets”). 
 124. Shapiro, supra note 111. 
 125. Relator’s Brief, supra note 37, at 16–17. 
 126. State ex rel. Parrott v. Martinez, 496 S.W.3d 563, 571 & n.12 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2016). 
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a board fee or that any such fee would be more than 1.5 times the com-
bined total of the restitution and court costs delineated in the orders of 
probation.127 
The Fleming court did not address this issue, but the “fundamental fairness” 
aspect of due process seems to be implicated. 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri considered a writ of habeas corpus re-
quested because of a claimed due process violation in a state probation revoca-
tion procedure.128  The primary issue in the majority opinion concerned the 
insufficiency of judicial process in a probation revocation proceeding.  The 
dissent focused on the appropriateness of issuing a writ of habeas corpus to a 
defendant already released on parole and the curious procedural outcome of 
this particular case. 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Breckenridge, writing for the majority, held that Fleming’s 
probation was improperly revoked and his due process and equal protection 
rights were violated.129  Further, the court found that it had the authority to 
issue a writ of habeas corpus to a petitioner released on parole based upon its 
authority under the Missouri Constitution and Missouri Revised Statutes sec-
tion 532.010.130 
The court determined that because the sentencing court merely accepted 
Fleming’s admission at the 2011 hearing and made no determination at the 
2013 hearing as to whether he (1) had the ability to pay court costs, (2) had 
failed to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay, or (3) had con-
sidered alternative forms of punishment, Fleming’s due process rights had been 
violated.131  Additionally, because there appeared to be ample evidence of 
Fleming’s indigence on the record before the sentencing court,132 and the pro-
bation officer assigned to the case had made a recommendation for the court to 
consider “alternative arrangements,” the failure to inquire was a violation of 
the Bearden rule.133  Finally, since the admission from Fleming that he had 
 
 127. Id. at 571 n.12. 
 128. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 225–26 
(Mo. 2017) (en banc). 
 129. Id. at 225. 
 130. Id. at 228–29. 
 131. Id. at 230. 
 132. The probation violation report contained references to Fleming’s “financial 
struggles,” mentioned that he had agreed that he could only pay ten dollars per month 
towards the fine, and stated that he had received a fee waiver for domestic assault clas-
ses he was obligated to take as part of the probation arrangement.  Id. at 227, 230–31. 
 133. Id. at 231. 
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violated the probation terms came more than a year and a half before the ulti-
mate revocation and he had continued to make payments in the interim, the 
court determined that he had made “significant, genuine efforts” to pay his 
court costs.134  Thus, because the only unsatisfied condition of probation was 
the failure to pay in full and the sentencing court neglected to determine any 
reason for that failure, probation was improperly revoked.135 
Because the court determined the impropriety of the imprisonment, the 
remaining task was to resolve the writ of habeas corpus.  The court stated that 
“the only options for the sentencing court are either to discharge Mr. Fleming 
or to reinitiate revocation proceedings.”136  The majority granted the writ and 
held that Fleming should be “discharged from his sentence of imprisonment 
and subsequent parole and restored to his status as a probationer.”137  In a foot-
note, Chief Justice Breckenridge rebutted Judge Fischer’s dissenting argu-
ments about statutory construction by noting that his interpretation of the stat-
ute would render the “restrained of his liberty” language superfluous, which is 
an undesirable outcome of statutory interpretation.138  The sentencing court 
was then instructed to hold a hearing within sixty days to determine whether 
Fleming was indigent and unable to pay the court fees due to his indigence, as 
well as determine if the State’s interests could be satisfied by instituting an 
alternative measure of punishment.139  If the sentencing court found that the 
Bearden requirements were met,140 it could once again revoke probation and 
execute the sentence.141  If such a finding were not made, or the State elected 
not to hold a hearing, Fleming would be discharged from his probation.142 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. at 232. 
 136. Id. at 233 & n.8 (citing State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 801 
(Mo. 2014) (en banc), for the proposition that normally “when a probation term ends, 
so does the court’s authority to revoke probation” (quotation marks omitted)).  How-
ever, a court has “the power. . . to revoke probation . . . for any further period which is 
reasonably necessary for the adjudication of matters arising before its expiration.”  MO. 
REV. STAT. § 559.036.8 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
 137. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 232. 
 138. Id. at 238 n.6 (“This Court must presume every word, sentence or clause in a 
statute has effect, and the legislature did not insert superfluous language.” (quoting 
Bateman v. Rinehart, 391 S.W.3d 441, 446 (Mo. 2013) (en banc))). 
 139. Id. at 234. 
 140. These requirements include a refusal to pay court costs despite the ability to 
do so, the failure to make bona fide efforts to acquire the resources to pay, and the 
consideration of alternative measures of punishment.  Id. at 230. 
 141. Id. at 234. 
 142. Id. 
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B.  Dissenting Opinions 
Judge Fischer and Judge Paul C. Wilson both dissented.  Neither disa-
greed with the majority’s application of Bearden.  Judge Fischer wrote sepa-
rately to critique the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to a defendant released 
on parole as well as to question the propriety of the outcome for Fleming, not-
ing that the reinstatement of probation may have left him in a worse position 
than his status as a parolee.143  Judge Wilson, writing separately, stated he 
would quash the writ based solely on the potential for a more harmful outcome 
for Fleming.144 
Judge Fischer’s primary argument was that the writ became moot once 
Fleming was released on parole.145  He argued that the statutory and constitu-
tional language granting Missouri courts the habeas power did not support such 
a broad application of the writ.146  To support this argument, he relied upon 
two maxims of statutory interpretation: noscitur a sociis147 and in pari mate-
ria.148  The only language that the majority could rely upon to grant the writ 
was the phrase “restrained of his liberty,”149 and Judge Fischer argued that 
those words must be read in conjunction with the surrounding language and 
harmonized with other references to the writ within state law.150  He suggested 
that because the phrase appears with language referring exclusively to physical 
confinement, being “restrained of liberty” should be interpreted the same.151  
Further, he pointed out that in Missouri Revised Statutes chapter 532,152 the 
petitioner for the writ is frequently referred to as a “prisoner,” bolstering his 
argument that the intention of the writ is to provide a means to release those 
 
 143. Id. at 234–38 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 144. Id. at 238 (Wilson, J., dissenting). 
 145. Id. at 234 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 146. Id. at 235. 
 147. Defined here as “a word [or phrase] is known by the company it keeps.”  Id. 
(alteration in original). 
 148. Generally defined as statutes concerning the same subject matter. Matthew 
Davis, Note, Statutory Interpretation in Missouri, 81 MO. L. REV. 1127, 1139 (2016).  
Judge Fischer cited State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.2d 31, 35 
(Mo. 2008) (en banc), to demonstrate that “[t]he provisions of a legislative act are not 
read in isolation but construed together, and if reasonably possible, the provisions will 
be harmonized with each another.”  Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 235 (Fischer, J., dissent-
ing). 
 149. MO. REV. STAT. § 532.010 (2016) (“Every person committed, detained, con-
fined or restrained of his liberty, within this state, for any criminal or supposed criminal 
matter, or under any pretense whatsoever, except when, according to the provisions of 
this chapter, such person can be neither discharged nor bailed, or otherwise relieved, 
may prosecute a writ of habeas corpus as herein provided, to inquire into the cause of 
such confinement or restraint” (emphasis added)). 
 150. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 235 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 151. Id. 
 152. The chapter of Missouri Code that deals exclusively with habeas corpus.  See 
generally MO. REV. STAT §§ 532.010–532.710 (2016). 
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physically held in custody.153  Finally, he cited previous Missouri cases that 
have similarly interpreted the writ as only applying to physical confinement.154 
Both dissenting judges argued that because Fleming received parole while 
the writ was under consideration by the court, granting the writ could hurt 
Fleming by returning him to probation and opening the door for a second pro-
bation revocation hearing, which could cause him to be returned to prison 
should the findings at the new hearing go against him.155  However, since his 
term of probation had expired in 2013, alternative measures of punishment 
could not be imposed by the sentencing court because the statute bars the court 
from changing a person’s probation terms after that probation has already ex-
pired.156  Thus, if the sentencing court chose not to discharge Fleming, the only 
legal means to continue probation would be to revoke his temporary, sixty-day 
status and place him on another five-year probationary term.157  Because five 
years of probation would be longer than his remaining time on parole,158 either 
of these outcomes would place Fleming in a worse position than if the writ had 
not been granted.159  Judge Fischer suggested that the adverse outcomes would 
be avoided if the court merely followed its holding in Aziz and mooted the 
writ.160 
V.  COMMENT 
This Part first analyzes the propriety and potential impact of the instant 
decision in Fleming.  It then discusses the implication of court fees based upon 
MIRA and the results when defendants fail to pay.  Further, this Part provides 
a snapshot of where Missouri stands today on these issues and aims to provide 
context for practitioners engaged in the defense of indigent clients. 
 
 153. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 235–36 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 236 (citing State ex rel. Nixon v. Jaynes, 63 S.W.3d 210, 214 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (“[T]he writ merely allows a prisoner to inquire into the cause of his confine-
ment.  A petition for habeas corpus relief under Missouri law is said to be limited to 
determining the facial validity of confinement.” (citation omitted)); State ex rel. Aziz 
v. McCondichie, 132 S.W.3d 238, 239, 241 (Mo. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding 
that while parole conditions “restrict a parolee’s activities” a petition for a writ of ha-
beas corpus is moot once a prisoner is released on parole since there is no longer any 
physical custody)). 
 155. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 237 (Fischer, J., dissenting); id. at 238. (Wilson, J., 
dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 237 (Fischer, J., dissenting) (pointing to MO. REV. STAT. § 559.021.7 
(Cum. Supp. 2017), which states that “[t]he court may modify or enlarge the conditions 
of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the probation term” 
(emphasis added)). 
 157. This would be allowed under MO. REV. STAT. § 559.036.5 (Cum. Supp. 2017). 
Id. 
 158. Fleming was eligible for discharge from parole on January 9, 2020.   Id. at 237 
n.6. 
 159. Id. at 237–38. 
 160. Id. at 237. 
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The procedural error and unjust result for Fleming in his revocation pro-
ceedings were so great that the Supreme Court of Missouri had to issue an 
extraordinary writ just to rectify the wrong.  Indeed, the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri sent a clear message to lower courts that there had better be a very com-
pelling reason to consider incarceration if a defendant’s sole failure is the pay-
ment of court-ordered LFOs.161  This message was transmitted through the re-
peated reminders in the majority opinion that the Bearden principles must be 
followed and through the subsequent issuance of the judicial bench card ap-
pending Missouri Supreme Court Rule 37.04.162  The decision will notify de-
fense attorneys that any decision to jail a defendant solely for failing to pay a 
debt will be subject to greater scrutiny and that sentencing judges should be on 
notice to consider alternatives when LFOs are left unpaid.  This is also an im-
plicit recognition that Missouri courts’ use of the threat of incarceration to col-
lect LFOs from clearly indigent defendants will no longer be tolerated to the 
same degree.163  With approximately eighty percent of criminal defendants in 
the United States qualifying as indigent and unlikely to afford private legal 
representation,164 as well as a notoriously overburdened Missouri public de-
fender system unable to effectively represent all qualifying defendants,165 it 
should come as no surprise that state judges are being called to task on this 
issue.  In 2015, Missouri passed Senate Bill 5, limiting the percentage of reve-
nue a municipality could raise from fees and fines, indicating that the legisla-
ture is also aware of the detrimental effect court fees have on poor communities 
within the state.166 
 
 161. Court-ordered LFOs include “all discretionary and mandatory fines, costs, 
fees, state assessments, and/or restitution in civil and criminal cases.”  MO. SUP. CT. R. 
37.04 app. D. 
 162. Id. 
 163. While a court cannot completely remove from its quiver one of its most effec-
tive arrows for securing the payment of imposed fines, judges and prosecutors should 
be encouraged to express greater sensitivity when dealing with indigent defendants.  
The court’s consideration of this issue makes sense in the context of other developments 
in Missouri. See CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE 
FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 55–58 (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.jus-
tice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_po-
lice_department_report.pdf (finding that municipality used arrests and threat of incar-
ceration primarily to secure payment for municipal fines, a practice that disproportion-
ately harmed indigent residents and members of racial minorities). 
 164. MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE 
AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 84 (2010). 
 165. See, e.g., Dan Margolies, Many Missouri Public Defenders Decline New Cases 
After State Supreme Court Disciplines Lawyer, KCUR 89.3 (Oct. 6, 2017) 
http://kcur.org/post/many-missouri-public-defenders-decline-new-cases-after-state-
supreme-court-disciplines-lawyer; see also  Hinkebein, Karl William – Suspension 
Stayed with Probation, MO. COURTS (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=117575. 
 166. See MO. REV. STAT. § 302.341 (2016); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 479.350–479.375 
(Cum. Supp. 2017). 
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While the majority’s conclusion that Fleming’s due process rights were 
violated was uncontroversial, Judge Fischer’s dissent highlighted other curious 
legal implications. First, whether the majority expanded habeas corpus rights 
in Missouri by granting a writ to a parolee or if, instead, the case was rendered 
moot once parole was granted.  Second, whether the nature of the relief granted 
left Fleming in a potentially worse position than had the petition been dis-
missed as moot.  These two issues are examined in more depth in the following 
two Sections. The final Section of this Part discusses the propriety of the Mis-
souri statutes responsible for trapping Fleming, and many other defendants, in 
legal jeopardy for financial deficiencies. 
A.  The Propriety of Issuing a Writ of Habeas Corpus to a Parolee 
Fleming had initially filed his writ of habeas corpus with the court while 
in his third year of incarceration after probation revocation;167 however, parole 
was granted in between his initial filing and the court’s decision to consider the 
writ.168  It appears that the release on parole was due to a standard, independent 
determination by the parole board and unrelated to the court’s acceptance of 
the writ.  Fleming then filed an amended petition against the Missouri Board 
of Probation and Parole, asserting that his “liberties [were] still unlawfully re-
strained” because of the improper revocation of his probation.169  Judge Fischer 
argued that canons of statutory interpretation and prior Missouri case law ren-
dered the petition moot upon the granting of parole.170  He also suggested that 
it was inappropriate to rely on authority from the Supreme Court of the United 
States applying the writ based on interpretation of federal statutes and that in-
stead state supreme courts should rely upon state authority for guidance.171  
While Judge Fischer’s sentiment for federalist principles and narrow interpre-
tation of the state habeas corpus jurisprudence is logical, his analysis omits 
consideration of other common law uses for the “great writ” that support the 
broader interpretation employed by the majority in this case. 
It does not appear that by granting a writ of habeas corpus to a parolee the 
court expanded the limits of habeas corpus beyond established law in either 
Missouri or the United States.  Because Fleming amended his petition to in-
clude the Board of Probation and Parole, a division of the Department of Cor-
rections that maintained “legal custody,”172 his case was comparable to 
Jones.173  Finding for the parolee in Jones, the Supreme Court of the United 
States examined numerous common law interpretations of habeas corpus in 
 
 167. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 231 (Mo. 
2017) (en banc). 
 168. Id. at 228. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. at 235–36 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 171. Id. at 237. 
 172. MO. REV. STAT. § 217.690.2 (2016). 
 173. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 243 (1963). 
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both England and the United States and determined that restraint of liberty, 
independent of physical incarceration, was sufficient to invoke the writ.174  The 
Jones Court went on to say that the writ “is not now and never has been a static, 
narrow, formalistic remedy” but instead has a “grand purpose – the protection 
of individuals against erosion of their right to be free from wrongful restraints 
upon their liberty.”175  The Court concluded that while “parole releases [Jones] 
from immediate physical imprisonment, it imposes conditions which signifi-
cantly confine and restrain his freedom . . . within the meaning of the habeas 
corpus statute; if he can prove his allegations this custody is in violation of the 
Constitution . . . it was therefore error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss his 
case as moot.”176 
Although the Jones Court considered a writ requested under federal stat-
ute,177 the circumstances of Fleming are similar and on point.178  The Supreme 
Court of Missouri determined that Fleming’s detention was unconstitutional 
for failures of due process and equal protection and that his status as a parolee 
“restrained his liberty” within the meaning of the state’s statutes and constitu-
tion.179  The broad interpretation of habeas corpus suggested in Jones, but-
tressed by centuries of common law jurisprudence, appears to have sufficient 
 
 174. Id. at 238–40 (At common law, “restraints on a man’s liberty. . . not shared by 
the public generally” have been held to invoke the writ, including: the restraint of a 
woman by her relatives against her will, by an alien held after seeking entry into the 
United States, by conscripts questioning involuntary enlistment into military service, 
and by parents disputing custody of a child.). 
 175. Id. at 243. 
 176. Id. (emphasis added). 
 177. It is important to note that the very language the dissent in Fleming claims 
narrows the Missouri statute to apply only to those held under physical restraint – spe-
cifically “custody” – is the only language found in the federal statute, which the Jones 
court grants a broad interpretation.  See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012). 
 178. In Jones, the defendant filed for a writ of habeas corpus in a district court based 
upon an unconstitutional conviction and was paroled shortly after he filed.  Jones, 371 
U.S. at 236–37.  The named respondent in the case was the superintendent of the Vir-
ginia state penitentiary, who moved to declare the petition moot upon the granting of 
parole.  Id. at 237.  Jones moved to amend his petition to include members of the Vir-
ginia parole board. Id.  The Fourth Circuit declined the amendment and dismissed the 
case as moot since the parole board did not have “physical custody” of Jones.  Id. at 
238.  The Supreme Court of the United States found that the parole board’s “significant 
restraints on petitioner’s liberty” were enough to render him within custody of the 
board.  Id. at 242–43. 
 179. State ex rel. Fleming v. Mo. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 515 S.W.3d 224, 234 (Mo. 
2017) (en banc).  Parolees in Missouri have a number of restrictive requirements they 
must satisfy in order to remain on conditional release from prison. Most of the require-
ments could be considered a “restraint of liberty” for the parolee as it “restricts the 
actions” a person may take.  First, parolees must obey all federal, state, and municipal 
laws and county ordinances, and any citation or arrest must be reported to their parole 
officer within forty-eight hours.  MO. DEP’T OF CORR., RULES AND REGULATIONS 
GOVERNING THE CONDITION OF PROBATION, PAROLE, AND CONDITIONAL RELEASE 2 
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armor to parry Judge Fischer’s feint of interpretive maxims.180  If the writers 
of Missouri’s constitution and habeas statutes had intended a narrow interpre-
tation – more akin to direct physical confinement – then the repeated references 
to “restraint of liberty,” which suggest an inherently broad and contextual de-
termination, would be rendered meaningless.  The interpretation suggested by 
the dissent would confine the power of the writ to a “static” and “formalistic” 
remedy and would erode the rights of citizens to be free from “restraints upon 
their [liberty].”181 
Missouri courts have also interpreted the “restraint of liberty” language 
in a broad manner.  In 1921, the Supreme Court of Missouri stated in dicta that 
“[a]n actual restraint is necessary to warrant interference by habeas corpus; but 
any restraint which precludes freedom of action is sufficient, and actual con-
finement in jail is not necessary.”182  As the majority in Fleming noted, this 
language has been echoed by the Supreme Court of Missouri at least twice 
since.183  There can be little doubt that the restrictions imposed upon an indi-
vidual’s freedom by a parole board fall within the “restraint” contemplated by 
the court in those cases.  Examples of such restraint could include: restrictions 
on travel, restrictions on moving residences, the requirement to maintain em-
ployment without the freedom to quit, restrictions on freedom to associate with 
 
(Aug. 2017), https://doc.mo.gov/sites/doc/files/2018-01/White-Book.pdf.  Second, pa-
rolees are restricted from travel outside the state unless approved in advance by a parole 
officer and contingent upon receipt of a permit.  Id. at 3.  Third, parolees must register 
the location of their intended residence and cannot live anywhere without express per-
mission from a parole officer.  Id.  Fourth, parolees must maintain some sort of em-
ployment and cannot change employment without advance permission from a parole 
officer.  Id. at 4.  Fifth, parolees are restricted from associating with any other persons 
convicted of a prior felony or misdemeanor, even if this person is a family member, 
unless authorized by a parole officer.  Id. at 5.  Sixth, parolees are subjected to regular 
drug tests and any failed test or failure to take a test may result in revocation of parole.  
Id. at 6.  Seventh, parolees are not allowed to possess, purchase, receive, sell, or 
transport any firearm or dangerous weapon.  Id.  Eighth, parolees must make regular 
reports to their parole officers; failure to report is considered a violation and may result 
in revocation.  Id. at 7.  Finally, parolees must pay an “intervention fee” for the duration 
of the parole period; this fee is set by statute, and failure to pay is considered a violation.  
Id. at 8.  Special conditions setting out certain restrictions based on the facts of each 
parolee may also be imposed.  Id. at 8–9. 
 180. See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the 
Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401–
06 (1950) (noting that whenever a legal practitioner “thrusts” with a maxim of statutory 
interpretation to convince another practitioner of the true intent or purpose of a statute, 
there typically exists an equally appropriate maxim to “parry” an interpretation in favor 
of the opposing side). 
 181. See Jones, 371 U.S. at 243. 
 182. Hyde v. Nelson, 229 S.W. 200, 202 (Mo. 1921). 
 183. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 228 n.6 (citing Nicholson v. State, 524 S.W.2d 106, 
109 (Mo. 1975) (en banc); State v. Gray, 406 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Mo. 1966)). 
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friends or family members, the requirement of regular reporting to a parole 
officer, or location monitoring using radio-frequency devices.184 
The dissent points to Aziz as precedent for declaring a parolee’s petition 
for a writ moot;185 however, the case is distinguishable in one vitally important 
way.  Aziz’s parole had been revoked and he was returned to prison, which was 
the catalyst for the filing of his writ, but he was again granted parole under 
stricter conditions while the matter was pending.186  Aziz’s petition challenged 
only the original revocation of parole, not the additional terms imposed upon 
his second release.187  If Aziz had amended his petition to challenge the pro-
priety of the stricter parole conditions as a “restraint of liberty,” and included 
the Missouri Board of Probation and Parole as an adverse party, then the case 
would not likely have been found moot because it would have been properly 
pled.  Fleming amended his pleading to overcome the procedural mootness that 
sunk the petition in Aziz, and the court appropriately considered the due process 
violations that led to Fleming’s incarceration in the first place.188  The broad 
interpretation of the language by the court in Fleming is a welcome reinforce-
ment of the right to challenge government restrictions to individual liberty in 
Missouri, particularly in cases where the defendant experiences a constitutional 
due process or equal protection violation.  Ideally, this sets a strong precedent 
for future decisions regarding the “restraint of liberty” language in Missouri 
habeas corpus jurisprudence. 
B.  The Nature of Relief Granted by the Court 
The second curious aspect of Fleming was the nature of relief granted by 
the Supreme Court of Missouri.  Fleming was discharged from his sentence of 
imprisonment and parole but then returned to his probationary status until the 
sentencing court conducted a Bearden-style evidentiary finding.189  This pro-
bationary status was decreed to be temporary and required the production of 
evidence – within sixty days – that Fleming’s failure to pay was willful or that 
he failed to make bona fide efforts to earn income to pay.190  If such evidence 
was not produced, then it was ordered Fleming be discharged from proba-
tion.191  As the dissents pointed out, if this finding were to come back against 
Fleming, his probation could be revoked once again and he would be returned 
to prison instead of being released on parole192 – an outcome that would render 
 
 184. See MO. DEP’T OF CORR., supra note 179, at 2–8. 
 185. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 236 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
 186. State ex rel. Aziz v. McCondichie, 132 S.W.3d 238, 238–39 (Mo. 2004) (en 
banc) (per curiam). 
 187. Id. 
 188. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 228. 
 189. Id. at 230–34. 
 190. Id. at 234. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 237 (Fischer, J., dissenting). 
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the granting of his writ of habeas corpus deeply ironic.  Further, because his 
probationary term had expired, if the State wished to impose alternative 
measures of restitution, such as community service, it would be up to the dis-
cretion of the court to re-impose a new term of probation of up to five years.193 
Fleming had already completed five years of probation, and although he 
had failed to complete his restitution payments within the prescribed time, he 
had abided by all other terms.194  His original revocation and reason for incar-
ceration were determined to be unconstitutional,195 and yet he was sent back to 
the mercy of the court that had imposed a seven-year prison term upon him just 
one month before his five-year probationary term was set to end.  It is difficult 
to see how justice is served when indigent citizens are jailed for the better part 
of a decade for their failures to pay a fine.  The fact that Fleming then served 
three and a half years in prison before any court recognized the problem and 
considered his writ of habeas corpus is a different failure altogether.  A simpler 
remedy would have been for the Supreme Court of Missouri to recognize that 
the due process violation was an injustice and discharge the remainder of Flem-
ing’s parole sentence.  This solution would have allowed for some firm meas-
ure of justice at the end of an unjust process, reduced a burden on the court 
system, and avoided a potentially absurd result.  Other decisions from the Su-
preme Court of Missouri have demonstrated increased scrutiny of the probation 
revocation process,196 yet it seems that the “remedy” offered to Fleming moves 
in the opposite direction.  On May 25, 2017, a probation and parole information 
report and final case summary were filed with the Twenty-Fourth Judicial Cir-
cuit.197  No further hearings were held, and apparently no additional evidence 
was produced.  According to the clerk of the circuit court, the final disposition 
for Fleming’s case is sealed, which is an indication his probation was success-
fully completed. 
However, as discussed in Section C, the incentive for the sentencing court 
to return Fleming to an extended probation may have ended with his incarcer-
ation in state prison.  Indeed, there is a perverse financial incentive for lower 
courts in Missouri to string along probationers who owe restitution for as long 
as possible and then ultimately revoke the probation and impose a jail sentence 
if they fail to pay. 
 
 193. Id. 
 194. See id. at 226–27 (majority opinion). 
 195. Id. at 225. 
 196. See, e.g., State ex rel. Strauser v. Martinez, 416 S.W.3d 798, 804 (Mo. 2014) 
(en banc) (holding that a court does not have authority to continue probation beyond 
the statutory maximum in order to ensure complete restitution payments); State ex rel. 
Zimmerman v. Dolan, 514 S.W.3d 603, 612 (Mo. 2017) (en banc) (holding that circuit 
court had not “ma[d]e every reasonable effort” to conduct a probation revocation hear-
ing prior to the end of the probationary period and therefore could not extend probation 
beyond statutory term). 
 197. Probation and Parole Information Report, State v. William A. Fleming, No. 
08D7-CR00864-01 (Mo. Cir. Ct. St. Francois Cty. May 25, 2017). 
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C.  Perverse Incentives of Jail Boarding Fees Under MIRA 
An important fact, which is largely ignored in the court’s opinion, is that 
the bulk of fines and fees assessed on Fleming came from the three months he 
spent in a county jail before pleading guilty.  His bond was set at a staggering 
$50,000198 – a sum higher than the median annual household income for Mis-
souri residents199 or an amount equivalent to over nine years of Fleming’s re-
ported SSI income.200  This bond amount was set despite his application for 
and receipt of public defender assistance – a service that, by law, is available 
only to defendants who are determined by the court to be indigent.201  Both the 
Missouri and United States Constitutions prohibit the imposition of excessive 
bail, but such excessiveness has rarely been found.202  While it is true that 
Fleming faced multiple domestic assault charges and society has an interest in 
mitigating potentially harmful encounters by keeping violent offenders away 
from their victims, the ultimate plea bargain resulted in his release on probation 
and only a ninety-two dollar obligation to the Victim’s Compensation Fund.203  
The purpose of bail is to secure an eventual court appearance from the accused; 
therefore, if Fleming had been considered too dangerous to return to civil so-
ciety, then no bail should have been set at all.  Thus, it appears that neither 
concern for the victim nor Fleming’s continued danger to society was the mo-
tivating factor for imposing such a large bail.  Meanwhile, because of his ina-
bility to post bail, his three months in county jail yielded a bill of $3870 – an 
amount which totaled approximately forty dollars per day, or $1300 per 
month.204  To put it another way, for the privilege of a couple of daily meals 
 
 198. Relator’s Reply Brief at 8, Fleming, 515 S.W.3d 224 (No. SC 95764). 
 199. Median Household Income Data Series, MO. ECON. RES. & INFO. CTR., 
https://www.missourieconomy.org/indicators/income/mhi_11.stm (last visited June 3, 
2018). 
 200. At the time of sentencing, Fleming received $449 per month for a back injury 
and bipolar disorder.  Relator’s Brief, supra note 37, at 5, 10. 
 201. Eligibility requires a finding by a circumstantial court that the defendant does 
not have the “means at his disposal or available” to obtain counsel.  See MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 600.086.1 (2016). 
 202. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed . . . .”); MO. CONST. art. I, § 21 (same); see also State v. Jackson, 
384 S.W.3d 208, 216–17 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (affirming that purpose of bail is simply 
to secure appearance of defendant and that any amount set higher is considered exces-
sive; however, court also recognized that “[b]ail is not excessive merely because a de-
fendant is unable to secure it” (quoting Dabbs v. State, 489 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1972))); see generally Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: 
The Eighth Amendment’s Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1 (2005) (demonstrating the 
difficulty of proving excessive bail). 
 203. Fleming, 515 S.W.3d at 226. 
 204. Id. at 226–27. 
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and a cot in county lockup, he was charged the equivalent monthly rent of a 
two-bedroom luxury loft overlooking downtown Saint Louis.205 
As mentioned above,206 MIRA207 is a powerful state law that permits the 
State to seize up to ninety percent of a current or former inmate’s assets208 to 
reimburse the State for the cost of the inmate’s “care.”209  The determination 
of whether an inmate is held liable under the statute is a combination of prose-
cutorial discretion and a mathematical formula.210  Once that determination has 
been made, the State has authority to seize nearly everything a prisoner owns 
or may earn in the future, short of his or her home.  The law has been subject 
to numerous legal challenges211 and public criticism from prison reform groups 
and journalists,212 yet it still remains in force. 
 
 205. St. Louis MO Apartments, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com (last visited June 
3, 2018) (search “St. Louis, MO”). 
 206. See supra Part III.C. 
 207. Missouri Incarceration Reimbursement Act, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 217.825–
217.841 (2016). 
 208. Id. § 217.833.  The definition of “[a]ssets” for purposes of the statute is very 
broad.  They are defined as: “tangible or intangible, real or personal, [property] belong-
ing to or due an offender or a former offender, including income . . . from any source 
whatsoever.”  Id. § 217.827(1)(a) (emphasis added).  Assets do not include a homestead 
with value up to fifty thousand dollars, or up to $2500 dollars of wages earned by the 
offender during confinement.  Id. § 217.827(1)(b). 
 209. Cost of care includes: “transportation, room, board, clothing, security, medical 
[care], and other normal living expenses of offenders under the jurisdiction of the [De-
partment of Corrections].” Id. § 217.827(2).  MIRA is an example of what are com-
monly referred to as “pay-to-stay” laws.  See generally Lauren-Brooke Eisen, Paying 
for Your Time: How Charging Inmates Fees Behind Bars May Violate the Excessive 
Fines Clause, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 319, 324–28 (2014) (describing various types of 
“pay-to-stay” laws). 
 210. § 217.831.3 (If the attorney general has good cause to believe offender or for-
mer offender has sufficient assets to cover the lower of ten percent of the total cost of 
care, or ten percent of the cost of care for a two-year period, then the attorney general 
may seek reimbursement under the statute.). 
 211. See, e.g., Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 861 (8th Cir. 1992) (federal anti-
discrimination laws preempt MIRA claim against federal civil rights judgment); State 
ex rel. Koster v. Cowin, 390 S.W.3d 239, 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013) (state cannot collect 
assets from inmate which were unidentified and unknown at the time of the MIRA 
hearing); State ex rel. Nixon v. Worthy, 247 S.W.3d 8, 14–15 (Mo. Ct. App. 2008) 
(gifts to inmate do not qualify as “stream of income” under MIRA); State ex rel. Nixon 
v. Watson, 204 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (attorney general must have 
“good cause” to believe that offender has sufficient assets as a condition precedent to 
filing a MIRA action); State ex rel. Nixon v. Jones, 108 S.W.3d 187, 193 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2003) (res judicata bars state from pursuing claim under MIRA for future costs since 
state had already pursued the claim once); State ex rel. Nixon v. McClure, 969 S.W.2d 
801, 802, 808 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (federal retirement benefits cannot be taken to re-
imburse state MIRA claim). 
 212. See, e.g., Jennifer S. Mann, A Hidden Punishment for Missouri Prison Inmates 
of Means: Room and Board, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (April 30, 2016), 
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The financial benefit of the law is dubious, at best.  In 2015, the State 
seized less than $600,000 under the law; forty-two percent of that amount – 
$267,413 – came from just two inmates.213  The collections under MIRA 
amounted to less than one percent of the Department of Correction’s $710 mil-
lion budget.214  With the average annual cost per inmate calculated at nearly 
$21,000 per year,215 the amount collected would only cover “care” for approx-
imately thirty of Missouri’s 32,500216 inmates.  There are also costs associated 
with enforcing the law in the state; for instance, the personnel costs to the office 
of the attorney general to prosecute MIRA cases,217 the cost in time and re-
sources of the judiciary, and the hidden economic cost from loss of the pris-
oner’s productivity while incarcerated.  Meanwhile, current and former prison-
ers who are forced to pay the fee not only lose nearly everything to their name 
but are subjected to collections and paycheck garnishments for years after re-
lease.218  The difficulties former prisoners face when attempting to return to 
the labor market after release are well documented,219 and subjecting them to 
wage garnishments in order to “pay for their stay” acts as a serious disincentive 




2e456d34bcb9.html; Emily Coleman, Paying Back Society: Prison Sentence Plus 
Room and Board, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN (May 19, 2010), https://www.columbiamis-
sourian.com/news/paying-back-society-prison-sentence-plus-room-and-board/arti-
cle_77867e12-8b79-5fc1-97fa-14ca1a992b03.html; Kelly Wiese, When Does a Pris-
oner’s Debt to Society End?, MO. LAW. WKLY. (May 21, 2009), http://molawyersme-
dia.com/2009/05/21/when-does-a-prisoner%E2%80%99s-debt-to-society-end/. 
 213. Mann, supra note 212. 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. MO. DEP’T OF CORR., ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2016) (on file with author). 
 217. The statute considers the attorney costs and states that they shall be paid from 
reimbursements under the act.  See MO. REV. STAT. § 217.841 (2016). 
 218. This is explicitly authorized by the statute, and any lien under MIRA takes 
precedence over any other outstanding debts owed by the offender.  MO. REV. STAT. § 
217.829.5 (2016) (allowing garnishment of wages for up to five years after release). 
 219. For example, there are numerous laws, rules, and regulations that discriminate 
against ex-offenders and effectively prevent successful reintegration into mainstream 
society.  Examples include restrictions on voting, jury duty, eligibility for federally-
funded health and welfare benefits, driving, eligibility for professional licenses, own-
ership of a firearm, and many other restrictions.  See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 
164, at 140–60.  Socially, former felons can be legally discriminated against when they 
seek employment or housing, can be ostracized from family or community support net-
works, and have little or no financial means to restart life outside of a cell.  See id. at 
94. 
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potentially serve as an incentive for former convicts to eschew traditional em-
ployment and return to criminal means to earn a living, potentially exacerbating 
the recidivism rate.220 
For prosecutors and counties, however, there is an added incentive to re-
voke probation for failure to pay assessed fines under MIRA.  Missouri has a 
complicated system of paying for the boarding of prisoners in county jails, in 
which the State reimburses counties for the time a prisoner spends in local 
lockup before transfer to a state facility.221  In fact, it appears that Missouri is 
the only state in the nation that has a reimbursement system set up in this man-
ner.222  The county receives prisoners’ cost reimbursement from the State only 
if the defendant enters the state penal system.223  A probationer who fails to pay 
the assessed board fee in time can be subject to revocation, at which point the 
sentencing court can impose a second probation term in an attempt to collect 
the remaining fee or impose the jail sentence in order to trigger reimbursement 
from the State.  There is clearly a perverse financial incentive for circuit courts 
to revoke probation for poor defendants who fail to timely pay board fees in 
order to collect the outstanding bill from a more solvent source.  Keeping the 
lights on in county lockup should not depend on cycling impoverished citizens 
through the criminal justice system at the expense of their freedom. 
The most direct solution to this problem would be to decouple state reim-
bursements for inmate costs to the county jails from a calculation of a county’s 
per diem inmate population.  The current structure encourages counties to keep 
offenders who may be liable for MIRA costs incarcerated in order to receive 
the maximum reimbursement in the event of a transfer to state prison.  Prose-
cutors and judges have discretion to seek these costs from defendants, and the 
 
 220. See ALICIA BANNON ET AL., CRIMINAL JUSTICE DEBT: A BARRIER TO REENTRY 
27 (2010), http://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/leg-
acy/Fees%20and%20Fines%20FINAL.pdf; RACHEL L. MCLEAN & MICHAEL D. 
THOMPSON, REPAYING DEBTS 2 (2007), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2012/12/repaying_debts_summary.pdf. 
 221. See MO. REV. STAT. § 221.105.3 (2016) (county authorities calculate per diem 
costs for boarding prisoners in jails and then bill those costs to the state at a rate not 
greater than $37.50 per day); MO. REV. STAT. § 221.160 (2016) (allowing for expenses 
for imprisonment of any prisoner prior to, and post, conviction to be paid as directed 
by law); MO. REV. STAT. § 550.020 (2016) (stating that the state shall pay the costs in 
all cases in which a defendant is sentenced to imprisonment in a penitentiary). 
 222. Benjamin Peters, Commissioners Say Missouri Is Falling Behind in Reimburs-
ing Counties for Jail Per Diems, MO. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2017), https://themissour-
itimes.com/44227/commissioners-say-missouri-falling-behind-reimbursing-counties-
jail-per-diems/. 
 223. See § 221.105.2 (“When the final determination of any criminal prosecution 
shall be such as to render the state liable for costs under existing laws . . . .” (emphasis 
added)); § 550.020.1 (“[I]n all cases in which the defendant shall be sentenced to im-
prisonment in the penitentiary . . . the state shall pay the costs, if the defendant shall be 
unable to pay them, except costs incurred on behalf of defendant.”). 
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threshold for defendant liability for the costs under the act is quite low.224  Ad-
ditionally, the State is currently behind in these payments to the counties,225 
leading to diminished quality of care for inmates226 and uncertainty in budget-
ing and planning.227  By disbursing funds to county penal systems based on a 
different metric – such as crime rate, population, or a variety of other non-per 
diem factors – the incentive for counties to keep jail beds full to receive the 
greatest marginal benefits from reimbursement would be diminished.  The cur-
rent structure has been in place since 1976228 and reflects a solution for a period 
of time when there were six times fewer inmates in state custody.229  A new 
approach should reflect the current conditions and population in state and 
county jails and provide a stable budgetary framework that counties can rely 
upon without the uncertainty of shifting the responsibility to the State when 
offenders are sent to the next level of lockup. 
Another potential solution would be to adjust the State’s approach to set-
ting cash bail bonds to allow offenders more opportunity to get out of detention 
while awaiting trial.   Fleming’s $50,000 bond was an amount that most resi-
dents of Missouri would struggle to raise.230  Even paying a bondsman the typ-
ical ten percent fee ($5000) would have been an insurmountable price for Flem-
ing, who struggled to pay off a smaller amount over his five-year probation 
term.  In fact, the rate of accused persons incarcerated and awaiting trial, often 
 
 224. See supra notes 113–14. 
 225. Peters, supra note 222. 
 226. Alisa Nelson, State Owes Counties $19 Million in Jail Payments; Missouri 
Sheriff Feels the Pain, MISSOURINET (Sept. 25, 2017), http://www.mis-
sourinet.com/2017/09/25/video-state-owes-counties-19-million-in-jail-payments-mis-
souri-sheriff-feels-the-pain/. 
 227. Alisa Nelson, Legislator Thinks Missouri Should Overhaul County Jail Pay-
ment System, MISSOURINET (Oct. 9, 2017), http://www.mis-
sourinet.com/2017/10/09/legislator-thinks-missouri-should-overhaul-county-jail-pay-
ment-system/. 
 228. § 221.105 (originally enacted in 1976). 
 229. Statistics come from the Bureau of Justice Statistics Correctional Statistical 
Analysis Tool (CSAT).  In 1978, there were reported 5637 offenders in custody within 
the state; by 2013 the number had grown to 32,330.  Corrections Statistical Analysis 
Tool (CSAT) – Prisoners, BUREAU JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/in-
dex.cfm?ty=nps (To view the annually reported population, use the tool to create a 
“custom table” using the Jurisdiction of “Missouri,” “All” years, “Yearend Popula-
tion,” and “Total Jurisdiction Population” as the first variable.).  In 1978, there were 
reported 5637 offenders in custody within the state; by 2016 the number had grown to 
32,461.  Id.; see also Joshua Aiken, Missouri’s Prison and Jail Populations, PRISON 
POLICY INITIATIVE (May 2017), https://www.prisonpol-
icy.org/graphs/MO_Prison_Jail_Population_1978-2015.html. 
 230. In fact, a 2014 study estimated that sixty-two percent of Americans struggle 
with “financial fragility” and could not even pay $1000 in the case of an emergency 
and would have to either borrow or sell property to cover an unexpected expense.  See 
Neal Gabler, The Secret Shame of Middle-Class Americans, ATLANTIC (May 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/05/my-secret-shame/476415/. 
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because of an inability to post bail, has grown at a faster rate than the oft-la-
mented and ballooning American prison population.231  Bail reform is a widely 
debated topic in the United States,232 and many jurisdictions have made 
changes in recent years to soften the impact high bail has on low-income of-
fenders.233  Modern technologies have made it harder for accused offenders 
awaiting trial to simply disappear,234 and the risk of flight can, in many cases, 
be determined by statistical inference.235  Reducing cash-bond amounts, or 
eliminating them altogether for cases without a high risk of flight or continued 
threat of violence to victims or other residents, would reduce the strain on local 
jurisdictions and allow offenders to keep their lives on track and adequately 
prepare their legal defenses while still “presumed innocent.” 
In Fleming’s case, his SSI disability payments were already subject to a 
garnishment to collect the boarding fees.236  In a stroke of bitter irony, once his 
probation was revoked and the seven-year sentence was imposed, his SSI pay-
ments were terminated and the State could no longer receive its garnishment.237  
 
 231. COUNCIL OF ECON. ADVISERS, FINES, FEES, AND BAIL: PAYMENTS IN THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM THAT DISPROPORTIONATELY IMPACT THE POOR 7 (Dec. 
2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/page/files/1215_cea_fine_fee_bail_issue_brief.pdf. 
 232. See generally CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY PROGRAM, MOVING BEYOND 
MONEY: A PRIMER ON BAIL REFORM (Oct. 2016), http://cjpp.law.harvard.edu/as-
sets/FINAL-Primer-on-Bail-Reform.pdf. 
 233. These changes have been seen at the state, county, and municipal level.  One 
highly publicized statewide change occurred in New Jersey at the start of 2017, which 
has embraced a formula known as a “risk assessment pool,” which relies on empirical 
data to determine an offender’s flight risk.  For a description of the changes generally, 
see Dorothy Harbeck, A New Calculus for the Measure of Mercy: Does the New Jersey 
Bail Reform Affect the Immigration Court Bond Hearings?, 44 RUTGERS L. REC. 106, 
107–11 (2016–2017).  At least five counties in Missouri have changed pre-trial deten-
tion policies based on “risk assessment pools” and guidance provided by a non-profit 
organization called The Laura and John Arnold Foundation.  Jasper County is one ex-
ample and has implemented such a policy change due to overcrowding in county jails.  
See Koby Levin, New Jasper County Pre-Trial Release Program Answers Plight of 
Poor, JOPLIN GLOBE (June 10, 2017), http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/lo-
cal_news/new-jasper-county-pre-trial-release-program-answers-plight-of/arti-
cle_508a9ff8-f22f-5898-8822-20a69b61b932.html; see also Jon Schuppe, Post Bail, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/specials/bail-reform (presenting 
a national perspective). 
 234. See Samuel R. Wiseman, Pretrial Detention and the Right to Be Monitored, 
123 YALE L.J. 1344, 1364–72 (2014) (examining the implementation, effectiveness, 
and costs of electronic monitoring technologies used for pretrial detention scenarios). 
 235. See, e.g., Shaila Dewan, Judges Replacing Conjecture with Formula for Bail, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/27/us/turning-the-
granting-of-bail-into-a-science.html. 
 236. Relator’s Brief, supra note 37, at 12–13. 
 237. Id.; see also SOC. SEC. ADMIN., WHAT PRISONERS NEED TO KNOW 1 (July 
2017), https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10133.pdf (“No benefits are payable for any 
month in which you are in jail, prison, or certain other public institutions.”). 
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Thus, the sentencing court’s discretionary choice to send Fleming to prison had 
little to do with removing a violent felon from society or ensuring a convicted 
criminal paid the “full price” for his actions.  Instead, by enforcing the law, the 
court was effectively acting as a collection agent for the county jail – ensuring 
that the bill for Fleming’s three-month confinement prior to trial could be sent 
to the state for a full refund.  Debtor’s prisons have been held to be unconsti-
tutional.238  Incarcerating probationers for a failure to pay pre-trial detention 
costs to trigger a collection from the state should be, as a matter of policy, 
ceased as well. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court of Missouri recognized the legal wrong that led to 
Fleming’s incarceration and took the necessary steps to fix it; however, the 
larger problem his case presented is far from solved.  In holding that sentencing 
courts are required to make a finding about a probationer’s ability to pay LFOs 
before revoking probation solely for a failure to pay, the court reaffirmed ex-
isting Missouri law, backed by precedent from the Supreme Court of the United 
States.  By issuing this ruling, the court notified lower courts, prosecutors, and 
defense attorneys that there will be additional scrutiny upon any decision to 
imprison Missourians solely for a failure to pay debts.  The due process viola-
tion Fleming experienced caused him to slip through the cracks of the legal 
system, which to remedy required a broad interpretation of an extraordinary 
writ.  As a result, he spent three years in state prison, at the incalculable expense 
of his freedom, while accruing a costly financial burden to state taxpayers for 
his incarceration and time spent navigating the justice system.  Without the 
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus and written opinion in this case, Fleming 
would have evolved from a criminal offender to another unknown victim of a 
flawed justice system.  At what point do the costs of maintaining Missouri’s 
current criminal justice system outweigh the societal benefits of punishing of-
fenders? 
The recent policy changes within the state regarding the imposition and 
management of LFOs indicate a trend that appears to favor reducing legal costs 
for state residents.  The result in this case is a prime example.  However, until 
the disproportionate imposition of boarding fees under MIRA are addressed 
and county courts and jails no longer have the incentive to keep criminal de-
fendants incarcerated pre-trial to receive greater reimbursement from the State, 
defendants like Fleming will continue to be jailed for failure to “pay for the 
 
 238. See, e.g., Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971) (unconstitutional to impose 
a fine and then automatically “convert[] it into a jail term solely because the defendant 
is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full” (quoting Morris v. Schoonfield, 
399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970))); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 243 (1970) (extending 
prison sentences past fixed statutory limits because defendant’s inability to pay a fine 
violates equal protection). 
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stay.”  The Missouri legislature and judiciary must continue to reform the ad-
ministration of criminal justice, particularly with regard to the financial impli-
cations for low income residents. 
32
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 83, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol83/iss2/13
